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Abstract
This paper provides an empirical examination of the economic impact of the Democratic
and Republican National Conventions on local economies. Our analysis from 1970-2005 of the
50 largest metropolitan areas in the country, including all cities that have hosted one of the
national conventions during this time period, finds that the presence of the Republican or the
Democratic National Convention has no discernable impact on employment, personal income, or
personal income per capita in the cities where the events were held confirming the results of
other ex post analyses of mega-events.
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1. Introduction
Convention tourism is big business in the United States. According to the Convention
Industry Council, in 2004 the meetings, conventions, exhibitions, and incentive travel industry
generated over $122.3 billion in direct spending and 1.7 million jobs. These figures are “more
than the pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing industry and only slightly less than the
nursing and residential care facilities industry.” (CIC, 2005) In hopes of gaining of piece of this
lucrative business, cities compete vigorously to host meetings and conventions, and billions of
dollars of taxpayer money has been directed towards the construction of ever larger and more
elaborate convention centers in cities all across the country.
Perhaps the most sought-after jewels of the convention industry nationwide are the
quadrennial National Democratic and Republican Conventions at which each party’s presidential
candidate is nominated. City and party officials suggest that these events generate significant
economic windfalls for host cities and also serve to focus national and even international
attention on the host city. For example, city officials of New York City and Boston claimed net
economic impacts of $255 million and $156 million, respectively, for the 2004 Republican and
Democratic National Conventions. These economic impact numbers figured prominently in press
releases promoting the 2008 Republican Convention in St. Paul/Minneapolis.
Economists, however, tend to be more skeptical of the large economic impact numbers
touted by event organizers. Our examination of 18 national political conventions from 19722004 suggests that the promoters’ rosy economic projections are overstated, and these events
have a negligible impact on local economies.
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Background
Economic impact analyses are divided into two main categories: ex ante studies and ex
post studies. Ex ante studies predict the economic effect of an event by estimating the number of
visitors to the event as well as their average expenditures. A multiplier is typically also applied to
these direct economic impact figures resulting in a total impact number that is often at least twice
as large as the direct economic impact. As noted previously, ex ante studies of national political
conventions routinely ascribe large benefits to these major events.
Critics of ex ante economic analysis, however, point out that these studies often suffer
from three major shortcomings that lead to an overestimation of the total net impact of these
events. First, ex ante reports often fail to account for the substitution effect which occurs when
local residents spend their money on convention-related activities rather than on other goods and
services in the local economy. As the Democratic and Republican national conventions primarily
draw delegates from across the country rather than from local areas, the substitution effect in
these cases is likely to be relatively small compared with, for example, a county or state political
convention.
The second concern in ex ante studies is the crowding out effect. The large crowds and
congestion associated with “mega-events” like the national conventions may deter people not
associated with the convention from engaging in economic activities in the host city. While
hotels, bars and restaurants, may do well during the convention, other retailers and service
providers may not benefit from the event and potentially could lose sales. This issue is of
particular concern during a national political convention which necessitates a high degree of
security and also may generate large crowds of protesters both of which will serve to dissuade
casual shoppers and diners and result in major disruptions for local residents. During the week of
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the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City, for example, attendance at
Broadway shows fell more than 20 percent compared with the same week a year earlier despite
the presence of tens of thousands of visiting conventioneers and journalists.
Many economists are also skeptical of the multipliers used in ex ante studies to generate
indirect economic benefits. Often the multipliers used are absurdly high, but even more careful
estimates of multipliers may be viewed with suspicion. Multipliers are calculated using complex
input-output tables for specific industries grounded in inter-industry relationships within regions
based upon an economic area’s normal production patterns. During mega-events, however, the
economy within may be anything but normal, and therefore, these same inter-industry
relationships may not hold. Since there is no reason to believe the usual economic multipliers
apply during major events, any economic analyses based upon these multipliers may, therefore,
be highly inaccurate (Matheson, 2004).
In particular, national conventions may result in large windfalls to national restaurant and
hotel chains and provide employment opportunities for hospitality workers and journalists from
across the country but may not result in significant wage gains for local employees. In this
situation, the economic gain from the event does not accrue to the host city but rather benefits the
bottom line back at corporate headquarters. It is local taxpayers, however, who are often asked to
foot the fill for convention center expansions and who suffer from the disruptions associated with
the event.
Finally, convention promoters often suggest that prominent events such as the Republican
and Democratic National Conventions give cities immeasurable benefits in terms of national and
international exposure by being placed in an intense media spotlight. While this contention may
be true, it must be realized that the attention a city receives may not portray the city in a positive
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light. In the realm of sporting events, the Summer Olympic Games in 1972 in Munich and in
1996 in Atlanta were marred by terrorist incidents, and Salt Lake City’s reputation suffered after
the bribery scandal surrounding its bid for the 2002 Winter Olympics. Host cities for political
conventions are similarly not immune from bad publicity. For example, the chaos and protests
surrounding the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago is still noteworthy even 40 years later.
It is hard to imagine that the city of Chicago benefited from its ill-fated moment in the sun.
Due to the difficulties associated with ex ante estimation, numerous scholars estimate the
effects of mega-events on local economies by ex post estimation which examines the actual
economic performance of local areas that host large events. While few ex post studies of
conventions are found in the existing literature, many authors have examined of major sporting
events such as the Olympics (Baade and Matheson, 2002; Jasmand and Maennig, 2007) or World
Cup (Baade and Matheson, 2004; Hagn and Maennig, 2007a; 2007b), the Super Bowl (Porter,
1999; Baade and Matheson, 2006; Coates, 2006), All-Star Games (Baade and Matheson, 2001;
Coates, 2006), and post season play in general (Coates and Humphreys, 2002; Coates and
Depken, 2006; Baade, Baumann, and Matheson, 2008). The overwhelming majority of ex ante
studies of mega-sporting events find little to no significant positive economic impact from
hosting these events. If the Republican and Democratic National Conventions are truly the
“Super Bowl” of the convention business, then based on the evidence of the actual economic
impact of the Super Bowl, cities hosting national political conventions have every reason to be
concerned about the real magnitude of the economic windfall they can expect.
The paper by Coates and Depken (2006) is of particular interest to our study. The authors
use taxable sales data from individual cities in Texas to measure the economic gains from
hosting a variety of sporting events including the Super Bowl and the World Series. Houston also
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hosted the 1992 Republican National Convention, and Coates and Depken include a control
variable for this event. They find that “the political convention reduced taxable sales by $19
million and reduced sales tax revenues by approximately $1.4 million.”

The Model
Two types of data have been used most frequently in the existing ex post studies for
professional sports. Coates and Humphreys (1999; 2002; 2003), Baade and Matheson (2001;
2004; 2006), Hagn and Maennig (2007b), and Jasmand and Maennig (2007) use annual data on
employment, personal income, or personal income per capita over a wide number of cities and
years to estimate the economic impact of sporting events. Clearly annual data is not ideal when
examining events with a relatively small duration such as a political convention. To this end,
other studies such as Porter (1999), Baade and Matheson (2001), Coates (2006), Coates and
Depken (2006), and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008) have used taxable sales data that are
available at a monthly or quarterly basis. Taxable sales data, however, cannot be used in
nationwide panels of political conventions because of cross-state differences in data availability
and taxation laws. This leaves two options: examining any political conventions that have taken
place in a single state using high frequency data or examining a large panel of conventions using
annual data. This paper uses the panel approach to look at multiple conventions over the period
1972-2004.
As noted by Baade, Baumann, and Matheson (2008), there are several approaches to
estimate the impact of an event on a city. Mills and McDonald (1992) provide an extensive
summary of these models, which seek to identify changes in economic activity through changes
in key economic variables in the short-run or the identification of long-term developments that
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enhance the capacity for growth. Our task is not to replicate explanations of metropolitan
economic growth, but to use past work to help identify any effects of political conventions on
economic indicators. To this end we have selected explanatory variables from existing models to
predict economic activity in the absence of the convention. Estimating the economic impact of a
convention involves accounting for normal activity and determining whether the presence of an
event of such national prominence increases economic activity. Thus, this approach depends on
our ability to identify variables that account for the variation in growth in economic activity in
host cities.
Our model estimates the changes in the growth rates of real personal income,
employment, and real per capita income attributable to political conventions in host cities
between 1969 and 2005. We use a sample of 50 metropolitan standardized areas (MSAs) that
have at least one million residents in 2005. This sample includes the 14 MSAs that hosted a
political convention (see Table 1) and a control group of MSAs that have not hosted a political
convention. Most of the host cities are relatively large compared to the rest of the sample. The
smallest MSA is Kansas City, which had a population of just under two million in 2005. For this
reason, we use growth rates to compare cities of different sizes and also present estimations.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of real personal income, employment, real per capita
income, and population.
The following is our baseline model for the estimations:
Yit = β 0 + β 1 POPit + β 2 OTHERit + β 3 CON it + γ t + α i + ε it

(1)

There are three different dependent variables ( Yit ): the growth rates of real personal
income, employment, and real per capita income in year t and MSA i. POPit is the log
population of city i in time t. This variable is removed from the real per capita income model
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since the dependent variable is already scaled by the population size. OTHERit is a vector of
dummy variables that represents other important economic events specific to an area that would
not be captured in the national economic business cycle or overall city growth rate. Examples of
such deviations include the tech boom in Silicon Valley during 1999 and 2000, the oil boom and
bust cycles in the 70s and 80s in oil-producing cities, and Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans
during 2005. For example, New Orleans in 2005 produces the minimum of each dependent
variable in Table 2. The specific variables, cities, and years included in OTHERit is available
from the authors upon request. CON it equals one if the MSA hosted a political convention that
year and zero otherwise. Finally, to account for the panel nature of our data, we include controls
for each year ( γ t ) and MSA ( α i ). Ideally, this specification allows MSAs to have different
intercepts and also purges national trends. In other versions of this model, we also included
controls for city-specific trends as well, but this addition added little explanatory power and did
not impact our main results.
We use several tests to ensure the dependent variables do not exhibit a unit root. First, we
perform Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for each city and each dependent variable. For
all three dependent variables, 48 of the 50 cities pass both tests at five percent. Of the other two
cities, one passes both tests at ten percent (Washington, D.C.), and one fails both tests (New
Orleans). We also perform unit root tests on the entire panel using tests from Levin, Lin, and Chu
(2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), which allow for panel-specific attributes such as
differing time trends and autoregressive paths. Both tests reject the existence of a unit root in all
three dependent variables.
Given the time-series nature of the data, the error term in equation (1) is likely to be
autocorrelated. While ordinary least squares regressions will produce consistent estimates, the
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standard errors will be incorrect. We use a test suggested by Wooldridge (2002) for
autocorrelation within each panel, which estimates εˆit = ρεˆi ,t −1 + u it . Under the null hypothesis
no autocorrelation, ρ = −0.5 , and all three dependent variables reject the null.
One method to account for the autocorrelation is to include an autoregressive component,
which changes our estimation model to
Yit = β 0 + β 1 Yi ,t −1 + β 2 POPit + β 3 TECH it + β 4 CFBit + γt i + α i + ε it .

(2)

Introducing a lagged dependent variable requires the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation
technique, which is sometimes referred to as a “difference GMM” model. This model is
described in several works, including Bond (2002) and Roodman (2006). This model begins by
differencing equation (1), which purges α i . Once the city-specific effect is removed, the model
uses higher-order lags of Yit to instrument for ΔYi ,t −1 . Any other independent variables that are
believed to be endogenous or predetermined (i.e., variables independent to the current error but
not previous errors) can be handled in the same way.
Given T = 35, there are 34 observations of the differenced dependent variable ( ΔYit ) for
each city. Given the first lag of the differenced dependent variable is endogenous ( ΔYi ,t −1 ), all of
the remaining 32 higher-order lags can be used as instruments for ΔYit . While the higher-order
lags should create missing values in practice, Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) show that
each instrument produces a useful moment condition. In other words, consider the moment
condition E[ Z it' Δε it ] = 0 , where Z it' contains the instruments (i.e., the higher-order lags) and Δε it
is the differenced error term. For the second-order lag instrument, the moment condition is
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∑y

i ,t − 2

Δε it = 0 if t ≥ 3 ; for the third-order lag instrument, the moment condition is

∑y

i ,t − 3

Δε it = 0 if t ≥ 4 ; and so on.

i

i

Consistency of this approach requires the error terms are independently and identically
distributed, which is typically cannot be assumed in dynamic panel models. For example, it is
plausible the variance of the error term (original or differenced) may differ across cities. A
weighting matrix W asymptotically corrects the moment condition: W =

1
N

v' v

v' v

∑ (Z Δε Δε Z ) ,
i

i

i

i

i

v
v
where Z i and Δε i are city-specific (T – 2) vectors. Using this weighting matrix, GMM

⎛1
minimizes ⎜
⎝N

v ' v ⎞ −1 ⎛ 1
⎜
i i ⎟W
⎠
⎝N

∑ Δε Z
i

v' v ⎞
i
i ⎟.
⎠

∑ Z Δε
i

v
To obtain the weighting matrix, it is necessary to have consistent estimates of Δε i , which
can be obtained using a different weighting matrix W1 =

1
N

v'

v

∑ (Z HZ ) , where H
i

i

is a (T – 2)

i

square matrix with 2 on the diagonal, -1 on all of the immediate off-diagonals, and zero
)
elsewhere. Thus, the first-step estimates the model using W1 to produce the estimates Δε it ,
which the second step uses in the weighting matrix W . While this correction produces the
desirable asymptotic properties, several works (Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Blundell and Bond,
1998, to name only two) suggest the standard errors in the second step are downward biased. We
use the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to adjust the standard errors. Finally, one
concern with the Arellano and Bond (1991) technique is over-identifying restrictions, especially
given the relatively long time period for each city in our data. We use a Hansen (1982) test to
determine the number of over-identifying restrictions.
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Table 3 presents the Arellano-Bond estimation results of equation (2) using each of the
three dependent variables. For brevity, we omit the estimates for the year dummies and the
OTHERit controls, but these are available upon request. The Arellano-Bond tests for
autoregressive errors produce the expected result. These tests suggest autocorrelation exists in
the first lag, which is expected and justifies the inclusion of the first difference of each dependent
variable. In addition, the same test suggests a second lag term is not necessary for any of the
dependent variables.
We find only the weakest evidence that political conventions increase economic activity
above normal fluctuations. All of the estimated six coefficients (Democratic and Republican
conventions for employment, personal income, and per capita income) are positive, but none of
the political convention controls are even close to statistically significant. Because all three
dependent variables are positively correlated, however, these results are really closer to two
pieces of evidence of net positive economic activity rather than six.

Conclusions
This paper provides an empirical examination of the economic impact of the Democratic
and Republican National Conventions on local economies. Confirming the results of other ex
post analyses of mega-events, particularly sporting events, this paper finds no statistically
significant evidence that these huge conventions contribute positively to a host city’s economy.
Our analysis from 1970-2005 of the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the country, including all
cities that have hosted one of the national conventions during this time period, finds that neither
the presence of the Republican nor the Democratic National Convention has a discernable impact
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on employment, personal income, or personal income per capita in the cities where the events
were held.
While the conventional wisdom regarding national conventions is that they bring fame
and fortune to host cities, our results suggest that any economic benefits are quite elusive. People
should view promises of economic windfalls from hosting national political conventions in the
same way they should view the campaign promises of the candidates at these very conventions –
with skepticism.
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Table 1: Political Convention Hosts

1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004

Democratic National Convention
Miami, Convention Center
Madison Square Garden, New York City
Madison Square Garden, New York City
Moscone Center, San Francisco
The Omni, Atlanta
Madison Square Garden, New York City
United Center, Chicago
Staples Center, Los Angeles
FleetCenter, Boston
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Republican National Convention
Miami, Convention Center
Kemper Arena, Kansas City
Joe Louis Arena, Detroit
Reunion Arena, Dallas
Superdome, New Orleans
Astrodome, Houston
San Diego Convention Center
First Union Center, Philadelphia
Madison Square Garden, New York City

Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable

mean

minimum

maximum

0.0306

Standard
deviation
0.0308

Percent personal income
growth
Percent employment
growth
Percent personal income
per capita growth
Percent population
growth

-0.3616

0.2083

0.0229

0.0253

-0.0774

0.1468

0.0157

0.0261

-0.3614

0.1960

0.0146

0.0147

-0.0176

0.0936
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Table 3: Arellano-Bond Estimation Results (standard errors in parentheses), all cities
Dependent Variable
Dependent variablet-1
Percent population growth
Democratic National
Convention
Republican National
Convention
Arellano-Bond test for
AR(1)
Arellano-Bond test for
AR(2)
instruments (lags of
differenced dep. var.)
Hansen test for overidentification

Personal income
growth
0.5064***
(0.0999)
0.0598
(0.1213)
0.0010
(0.0027)
0.0049
(0.0045)
z = -4.62
p = 0.000
z = -0.92
p = 0.357
2,3,4,5

Employment
growth
0.6059***
(0.0796)
0.0674
(0.1358)
0.0022
(0.0034)
0.0005
(0.0078)
z = -5.03
p = 0.000
z = -1.32
p = 0.188
2,3

Personal income
per capita growth
0.2556*
(0.1408)

χ 2 = 0.43

χ 2 = 1.01

χ 2 = 1.47

p = 0.933

p = 0.316

p = 0.832

0.0016
(0.0024)
0.0026
(0.0046)
z = -2.32
p = 0.021
z = -0.96
p = 0.339
2,3,4,5,6

For brevity, we omit the year dummies, city fixed effects, and the coefficients on the vector of
OTHERit variables. Full results are available from the authors upon request.
***

Statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
Statistically significant at the 5% significance level.
*
Statistically significant at the 10% significance level.
**
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